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statute 
to defendants' counsel defendants' had actual and constructive knowledge 
of the attorney's entitlement to a lien, as it applies to defendants' counsel who possesses 
settlement funds, and as it applies to defendants' counsel who concealed both the actual 
settlement and proceeds from that settlement from the attorney claiming the lien. 
The course of the proceedings below and the disposition 
Judge Hoagland granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss according to I.R.C.P. 12(b), 
denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and 
awarded Attorney Fees to Defendants according to I. C. § 12-121. The Court also granted 
Intervenor's 1 Motion to Seal Records. 
Facts 
The Appellants, (Collectively "Clark"), were Plaintiffs' counsel and ultimately co-
counsel with the Spence Law Firm in Forbush, et al., vs. Sagecrest, et al., Ada County Case No. 
CV 1304325. ("Forbush case") (R. p. 9). 
Two of the Defendants in the Forbush case were Anfinson Plumbing, LLC and its 
employee Daniel Bakken, both of whom were represented by the Respondents, (Collectively 
"Jones Gledhill"). (R. p. 9). 
1 "Intervenor's" are Clark's former Clients, who are also represented by Jones Gledhill's counsel. (R. p. 35). Clark 
believes that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case to the Spence Law Firm as likely there is an 
indemnification and hold harmless clause in the Anfinson Plumbing settlement documents. 
Appellants' Brief - 1 




Order). Clark also 
in this case. (R. 
incorporates essentially the same factual 
allegations stated in Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss filed i~'Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-160421?2, (R. pp. 293 
-296, filed on appeal under seal by Court Order), which however remains a public record in 
Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Canyon County Case No. CV-2016-06347-c.3 The Complaint 
Clark filed in Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-1604217 is also in the 
record on appeal. (R. pp. 329-342, which remains a public record in that case, but which is filed on 
appeal under seal by Court Order). 
Clark and the Spence Firm had a fundamental disagreement concerning the Spence 
Firm's recommendation to the Clients in the Forbush case to pursue settlement with A.O. Smith 
after the Spence Firm failed to present relevant evidence in response to A.O. Smith's motion for 
Summary Judgment, which the Court ultimately granted.4 The disagreement with Clark led the 
Spence Firm to present an ultimatum to Clients regarding who would continue to represent 
Clients in the Forbush case. (R. pp. 240-41 ). The Spence Firm informed Clark that should the 
Clients choose Clark, the Spence Firm would withdraw and assert its lien on any proceeds Clark 
obtained. (R. pp. 243-46). 
2 Which is now titled, Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Canyon County Case No. CV-2016-06347-c, after a change of 
venue. 
3 Please see Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice filed in this Appeal. 
4 Judge Copsey ruled that A. 0. Smith did not owe Plaintiffs any duty of care and granted summary judgment. 
Because Judge Copsey so ruled any remaining defendants have no authority to include A.O. Smith on the verdict 
form or allege A. 0. Smith somehow had some comparative fault. 
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15. 
Upon withdrawing from 
defendants, including Jones Gledhill, 
case, sent a letter to counsel 
which Clark asserted a according to 
the remaining 
§ 3-205, 
and requested that Respondents protect Clark's lien by including his name on any settlement 
check. (R. pp. 12 and 15). Neither addressee responded or denied Clark's entitlement to a lien 
under the circumstances. 
Notwithstanding Clark's request, and Jones Gledhill's knowledge that Clark was attorney 
ofrecord for Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for at least as long as Jones Gledhill's involvement in 
that case, Jones Gledhill concealed the settlement and failed to protect Clark's interest in the 
settlement funds. (R. p. 12). Jones Gledhill delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Law 
Firm and proceeded to dismiss the Forbush v. Sagecrest case. 
Clark's co-counsel, the Spence Law Firm, who also had knowledge of Clark's lien, (R. p. 
232), also concealed the settlement from Clark and thereafter refused to pay Clark any fees to 
which he was entitled for his three and half years of work in the For bush case, and thereafter 
sought to extort a settlement from Clark by withholding Clark's attorney fees. (R. p. 234). 
Clark has had to sue his former co-counsel to recover his entitled attorney fees because 
Jones Gledhill failed to protect Clark's lien and the Spence Firm has refused to pay Clark his 
entitled fees. Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-1604217. Clark filed 
that action on March 3, 2016, and before filing suit against Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016. 
-3 
2. Whether the District Court it awarded attorney to Respondents? 
3. Whether the District Court exercised appropriate discretion when it ordered documents 
sealed that were already of record in a separate case filed in Ada County? 
Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal? 
I. Legal Standards on Appeal 
Statutory Interpretation 
ARGUMENT 
Recently the Idaho Supreme Court, in Hoffer v. Shappard, reiterated its duty to evaluate 
statutes giving utmost regard for legislative intent. 
'The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.' 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 'When 
interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the 1 iteral words of the statute .... ' 
Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515,521,260 P.3d 1186, 1192 
(2011 ). 'If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body must be given effect .... ' Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada 
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This 
Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative 
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l 1\ifed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 
P.3d 502,508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,177,369 P.2d 
1010, 1013 (1962)). 
Hojfer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 884, 380 P.3d 681,695 (2016). 
The Supreme Court had previously stated that when interpreting statutory language, the 
Court must interpret the words chosen by the legislature by their "plain, usual and ordinary 
- 4 
., 151 
P.3d 502, 506 (2011). 
The Supreme has also defined statutory ambiguity and concluded that a statute is 
only ambiguous if the language could be construed so as to have two rational meanings. "A 
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. 
Ada Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary A1otorcycle, 154 Idaho at 353, quoting Porter 
Bd. o/Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 ldaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). 
In Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079, (1981), interpreting 
§ 3-205, the Supreme Court determined that the attorney lien statute specified five elements 
a valid lien: 
( 1) (T)hat there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on equitable 
principles, 
(2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to secure the fund 
out of which he seeks to be paid, 
(3) that it was agreed that counsel look to the fund rather than the client for his 
compensation, 
(4) that the lien claimed is limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in the 
litigation by which the fund was raised and 
(5) that there are equitable considerations which necessitate the recognition and 
application of the charging lien. 
Then in Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 660 P.2d 928 (1983), the Supreme Court 
distinguished the Frazee fact situation because there was no settlement "fund." "We note the 
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a Skelton v. Spencer situation. 
B. Standard for Review on Appeal 
1. Statutory Interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 524, 
526 (2009), citing State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P .3d 850, 852 (2001 ). 
2. Abuse of Discretion. "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly 
perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the 
correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Elliott v. 
Murdock, 2016 Opinion No. 141, at *4 (December 2016), quoting O'Connor v. Harger 
Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, ] 88 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
IDAHO'S ATTORNEY LIEN STATUTE IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
PROVIDES FOR AN ATTORNEY LIEN TO AUTOMATICALLY "ATTACH" TO ANY 
SETTLEMENT "FUND" 
The Idaho legislature, when it enacted Idaho's attorney lien statute, clearly and 
unequivocally stated their intent that the attorney's lien attaches from the "commencement of the 
action." 
3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation 
of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of 
the parties, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an 
action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who 
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, 
which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and 
the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be 
-6 
Supreme ruled statutes are nature 
Bldg. Supply v. SUAfPER, 139 Idaho 846,851, 87 P.3d 955,960 (2004). As remedial 
legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of 
the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959 
(2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on this point is to allow the attorney an interest 
in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures his right to compensation for obtaining the 
or ·fund' for his client. Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 77,625 P.2d 1072, 1080 
(1981). 
In Frazee, the Supreme Court found that an attorney charging lien did not attach until the 
party claiming the lien took "some affirmative act ... in reducing it to a judgment or order of the 
court. Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466. However, as the Supreme Court noted in that case, 
Frazee did not apply to overrule Skelton v. Spence. "We note the difference in the instant case 
from the situation in Skelton v. Spencer, supra. There a "fund" was in existen." Frazee v. Frazee, 
104 Idaho at 466. The "fund" vs. "no fund" situation is a key distinction when interpreting and 
applying the lien statute that the District Court disregarded below. If there is a fund, then the 
attorney lien statute applies. If there is no fund arising from the attorney's efforts, as in the 
Frazee situation, then no lien attaches until it is "perfected" through some judicial proceeding. 
In this case, like the Skelton case, there was a "fund" created by the Anfinson plumbing 
settlement, so Frazee is not applicable and the District Court's reliance on Frazee was error. The 
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no 
seems to recognize the possibility of a charging lien a 'non-fund' situation. Frazee v. 
104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928 (1983)." In re Harris, 258 BR at 14. 
Moreover, while the "potential economic coercion" that concerned the Supreme Court in 
Frazee is limited to the situation presented in Frazee where an attorney sought to attach property 
outside of the case or not associated with any "fund" created by the attorney's efforts. There is 
no similar threat or concern, however, when the claim of lien attaches to the fund created by the 
attorney's efforts and limited by his contractual agreement with clients, which is the situation 
here. 
By the clear wording of the Attorney Lien Statute, the attorney lien attaches to the 
fund when created. 
From the commencement of an action, ... a party has a lien upon his client's 
cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or 
judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they 
may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before 
or after judgment. (Emphasis added) 
I.C. § 3-205. 
If there is no "fund," a situation not addressed specifically in LC. § 3-205, then an 
attorney must sue to perfect the lien, and no liability attaches before the lien is perfected. That is 
the limited ruling in Frazee. To rule otherwise and require an attorney to "perfect" their attorney 
lien before liability could attach in all cases undermines the intent of the lien statute and conflicts 
with the clear wording of LC. § 3-205. 
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and amount of any liability can then be determined in litigation necessary. That 
"someone" certainly can be the client, co-counsel, or opposing counsel as each falls into the 
broad category of" ... whosoever hands they may come .... " Here, Jones Gledhill knew Clark had 
been Plaintiffs' counsel for several years, knew that Clark was claiming a lien, and knew there 
was a settlement. Thereafter, Jones Gledhill either possessed or controlled the settlement funds. 
Then, notwithstanding Jones Gledhill's knowledge Clark was entitled to a lien, Jones Gledhill 
ignored and disregarded Clark's lien and delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Firm. As 
Clark's lien arose by statute upon settlement, and the lien attached to those "proceeds" and in 
··whosoever hands they may come," it was error to dismiss Clark's case. Clark has a cause of 
action against Jones Gledhill for the amount of his lien or any damages associated and resulting 
Jones Gledhill' s failure to protect Clark's interest, including the litigation costs Clark is 
incurring to pursue his claim against the Spence Firm and his former clients. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED CLARK'S CASE 
To the extent the District Court based its decision by interpreting I.C. § 3-205, that 
decision is subject to free review. As nothing in the statute requires an attorney to do anything to 
affirmatively perfect his lien, then the District Court's ruling that LC. § 3-205 requires some 
"affirmative judicial action" to perfect an attorney lien is contrary to the clear and unambiguous 
language in I.C. § 3-205. There is no language in this statute that even remotely addresses any 
-9 
to the extent that District Court's decision is based on application of 
existing case law, then the abuse of discretion standard applies. This Court should also reverse 
as the District Court did not apply the correct legal standard and therefore abused its discretion 
when it dismissed Clark's case. 
The District Court ruled below, relying on Frazee and In re Harris, that as Clark had not 
yet perfected his lien, no liability could attach to Jones Gledhill. 
... Without affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his lien by "reducing it to a 
judgment or order of the court," no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of 
money on behalf of his former clients. See Frazee v. Frazee, I 04 Idaho 463, 466, 
660 P.2d 928,931 (1983); In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 14 (Bkrtcy. D. ldaho 2000). 
The law requires these affirmative adjudicative actions to strike a proper balance 
between potential economic coercion and equity. (R. p. 68). 
Had Clark taken some affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the 
amount owed would have been reduced to an amount certain, taken the form of a 
court order or judgment, which would have then been applicable to the parties and 
their counsel. Violation of that order could have been enforced by contempt 
and/or by a damage action against the parties and attorneys. (R. p. 68). 
But Clark took no such affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his claimed 
lien. Neither was there a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill. 
Consequently there was no order or contract that these Defendants violated. They 
owed no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests. It was 
Clark's duty to protect his own interests, which he failed to do. (R. p. 69). 
Undeniably, the District Court's ruling is limited to its interpretation of Frazee. Again, 
however, unlike the Frazee case, there was a settlement fund to which Clark's lien attached by 
statute, the very situation in Skelton, and distinguished in Frazee. If the lien attached to the 
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was 
been addressed in the proceeding below. Based on the facts presented here, Frazee was 
inapplicable, so the District Court's reliance solely on that case was error. Accordingly, the 
District Court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard and should be reversed. 
Moreover, even for the sake of argument that Frazee did apply, the District Court's ruling 
ignores the fact that Jones Gledhill directly interfered with Clark's ability to "perfect" his lien. If 
Jones Gledhill would have been liable had Clark perfected his lien, as the District Court ruled, 
(R. p. 68), why then would Jones Gledhill escape liability when they interfered with Clark's 
ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? Clark believed he had adequately pled that 
Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to timely perfect his lien in his Complaint. (R. 
pp. 8-23). However, although Clark sought leave to amend his complaint to very specifically 
plead that Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to perfect his lien, (R. pp. 305-317), 
Judge Hoagland summarily denied that motion and disregarded the additional facts as pled. (R. 
pp. 74-76). The District Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Frazee, that a "charging lien of an attorney is equitable in 
nature .... " Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466. Thus, all equitable defenses apply, including 
unclean hands and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because 
Jones Gledhill, who knew Clark was asserting a lien, and who then purposefully and 
intentionally withheld information from Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent Jones 
- 11 
Perhaps Clark seeks to perfect the claimed lien in the other case against the 
former clients and Spence, but the settlement check and proceeds have already 
gone through the hands of these Defendants, never to return. Thus, Plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of a claim that would entitle him to relief against 
these Defendants. 
To properly exercise its discretion, the District Court must apply the correct legal 
standard. "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted 'unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that 
would entitle him to relief.' Gardner v. Holl(field, 96 Idaho 609,611,533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975). 
When reviewing a district court's dismissal of a case under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court draws 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 
102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party, the Court then examines whether a claim for relief has been stated. Id." Taylor v. Maile, 
142 Idaho 253,257, 127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005). 
Here, the District Court should have considered Jones Gledhill's conduct in interfering 
with and preventing Clark from taking "affirmative adjudicative actions," either as pied or 
pursuant to Clark's timely Motion to Amend. Had Jones Gledhill informed Clark there was a 
settlement when the settlement occurred and that Jones Gledhill did not intend to honor Clark's 
lien or his request to put his name on the settlement check, then Clark certainly could have taken 
the "affirmative adjudicative actions" the District Court deemed necessary. Instead, Jones 
Gledhill concealed the settlement and delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Firm before 
- 12 
an s it must 
construed "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature," then Judge Hoagland's decision 
is contrary to the stated purpose and requisite interpretation of this statute. Moreover, Clark pied 
facts that should have entitled him to some relief, so Judge Hoagland's dismissal was contrary to 
the applicable standard when considering a Rule l 2(b) Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, even if 
Frazee was applicable, the District Court failed to apply the correct legal standard and abused its 
discretion when it disregarded Jones Gledhill's conduct that prevented Clark from timely 
perfecting his lien. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
ATTORNEY FEES BELOW TO JONES GLEDHILL 
AWARDED 
The District Court also granted Jones Gledhill's motion for attorney fees pursuant to LC. 
§ I 121, but denied the request according to 1 20 and 12-123. (R. pp. 205-215). Clark 
now incorporates his argument above that the District Court erred when it dismissed his case. If 
this Court reverses the District Court and reinstates the case, then Clark requests the Court 
summarily reverse the award of attorney fees. In the alternative, Clark argues the District Court 
abused its discretion when it awarded Jones Gledhill's attorney according to LC.§ 12-121 even 
if this Court affirms the District Court's decision granting the Rule 12(b) motion. 
An awarding Court must have an ·'abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and 
without foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees 
'when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought 
- 13 
) an 
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and 
without foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court 
concludes it fails as a matter oflaw. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 
Idaho 890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the 
law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is 
whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be 
deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 
950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App. I 997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)." 
Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,468,259 P.3d 608,614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case 
involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under § 12-121." 
Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005). citing Graham v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611,614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003). 
The District Court granted some5 of the requested attorney fees according to LC. § 12-
121, because the Court found that Clark had ignored Frazee . 
. . . But Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take 
affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claimed lien 
unenforceable. Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983) 
("The equitable source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney 
take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a 
judgment or order of the court"). If Plaintiff had perfected the lien through an 
5 Jones Gledhill's Attorneys billed 77 hours for allegedly perfonned pursuing the motion to dismiss, and an 
additional 54 hours (6.76 eight-hour days) just for drafting the motion to costs and attorney fees alone. (R. p. 294). 
Judge Hoagland ruled these claims were "unreasonable and excessive." 
Appellants' Brief - 14 
§ 
not a new or § 
argue that the law should be extended or modified. Plaintiff's "novel legal 
question" merely argued that the Court should ignore established precedent, 
which it has declined to do. (R. p. 212). 
Actually, Clark argued in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that the statutory language 
of Idaho Code § 3-205 controls, (R. pp. 255-60), and on reconsideration, that the Court should 
distinguish Frazee because that ruling conflicted with the clear wording of Idaho Code § 3-205, 
(R. pp. 319-22). Clark therefore did not pursue the case frivolously or without foundation. 
Additionally, in opposition to Jones Gledhill's Motion for Costs and Attorney fees, Clark 
argued this case presented the novel legal issue of opposing counsel's interference with Clark's 
ability to perfect his lien. (R. pp. 181-82). Accordingly, even if Clark was required to perfect 
his lien, there was no case law that addressed the issue presented here that the Defendants had 
notice of Clark's entitlement to a lien, but concealed the settlement and delivered the funds to the 
Spence Firm without Clark's knowledge. The facts below were sufficiently distinguishable from 
rrazee, and Clark argued in good faith that Frazee did not apply. Clark's conduct in the case 
was therefore not frivolous. 
Clark also presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability, as 
opposed to his client's liability, under this statute, which was not addressed in Frazee or any 
other Idaho case. Clark prevailed on this issue as the District Court ultimately ruled that a 
perfected lien under the circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their 
counsel." (R. p. 68). The District Court also rejected Jones Gledhill's arguments in their Motion 
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Additionally, Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a 
"perfected" lien, liability attached according to the statute. Clark argued based on the undisputed 
facts that Jones Gledhill had knowledge of Clark's lien claim, that there was a fund to which the 
lien attached, and because Jones Gledhill possessed the liened funds but concealed the settlement 
until after Jones Gledhill had delivered the funds, then Jones Gledhill should be liable, perfected 
lien or not. (R. p. 181-82). Again, if the intent of the lien statute was to protect the attorney's 
hard work and entitlement to fees, Judge Hoagland's decision effectively did just the opposite 
and actually promotes subterfuge and deception by opposing counsel. 
Finally, Clark argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is 
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and as Clark was seeking to perfect the lien through 
adjudication in the Clark v. Forbush case, at best the Jones Gledhill case was not yet ripe and 
any dismissal should have been without prejudice. (R. p. 322). 
The District Court also based the award of fees on its erroneous conclusion about records 
being sealed in the Clark v. Forbush case. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' took action that increased the cost of litigation by filing 
documents that were under seal in another case but were not sealed in this 
case. Defendants responded by filing a Motion to Seal in this case, which the 
Court granted. And ultimately, the documents did not add anything to the 
Plaintiffs' case anyhow. (R. p. 212-13) (Emphasis added). 
This simply is not true. Clark filed a motion to reconsider and showed the Court 
that the documents and information that Judge Hoagland sealed in the Jones Gledhill case 
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the same documents and infonnation that Judge Hoagland claimed was "under 
seal another case," were not in fact under seal and remained a public record. 
While a Judge has discretion to award attorney fees pursuant to authority to grant 
attorney fees under LC. § 12-121, the Court must reach its decision "through an exercise of 
reason. Judge Hoagland's myopic focus on the holding in Frazee, without due consideration to 
distinguishing facts presented here resulted in a decision to award attorney fees that lacked 
reason. Therefore, Judge Hoagland abused his discretion when he awarded attorney fees to 
Jones Gledhill and that decision should be reversed. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SEALED 
DOCUMENTS IN THIS CASE 
As shown by Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice below, (R. pp. 48-52), which Judge 
Hoagland denied, and Clark's recent Motion for Judicial Notice filed with the Supreme Court, 
each record and all information Judge Hoagland ordered to be sealed in the Jones Gledhill case 
was of record and unsealed in the Clark v. Forbush case. Notwithstanding Judge Hoagland 
knew that the records sought to be sealed were unsealed and a public record in Clark v. Forbush, 
Judge Hoagland ruled that the information should be sealed because the disclosure could result in 
"economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's former clients." 
As required by Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), the Court makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: The former clients' interest in 
privacy of the confidential material predominates, given the privileged and 
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stipulated to a protection order regarding same material 
in the other case where he sued his former clients and Spence. (footnote omitted) 
The Court finds the materials sought to be sealed contain facts and statements that 
could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's former 
clients. 
The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary and proper to seal 
the requested material. Accordingly, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED and pages 
two through five of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 of Eric R. Clark's Declaration filed May 
4, 2016 shall be sealed. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Eric R. Clark's March 30 
Declaration, attached to Exhibit I of the May 9th Declaration shall also be 
sealed. Finally, Exhibits l and 2 of Eric R. Clark's Second Declaration, attached 
as Exhibit 2 to the May 9th Declaration shall be sealed. (R. p. 69). 
While a District Court has discretion to seal records, it is hard to imagine any reasoned 
basis to seal records or information in one case when exactly the same records or information 
remains is in the public record and unsealed in another case in the same Idaho Judicial District. 
as proven in Clark's recent Motion for Judicial Notice filed with the Supreme Court, the 
very information remains in the public record and unsealed, despite a confidentially order in the 
Clark v. Forbush case. Again, the District Court did not reach its decision to seal records in this 
case through an exercise of reason and therefore abused its discretion. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek attorney fees on appeal according to I.AR. 41, and I. C. § 12-121. 
"An award of attorney fees is appropriate on appeal under LC. § 1 121 when the appeal has 
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Teurlings v. 
Afallory E. Larson Nka Mallory E. Martinez, 156 Idaho 65, 75,320 P.3d 1224, 1234 (2014). 
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the claim with argument as well as authority'. 
The Appellants reserve argument to support their claim for attorney fees pursuant to 
§ 12-121 until after the Respondents have filed their brief, as prior to that time, Appellants have 
no basis to argue the appeal was defended frivolously or without foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred when it dismissed the Appellants' case pursuant to LR.C.P. 
12(b) and denied the Appellants' Motions to Amend their pleadings and to reconsider, as the 
Appellants' attorney lien had arisen by statute and attached to settlement funds possessed by the 
Respondents. Consequently, the Appellants had stated a viable cause of action against the 
Respondents and it was reversible error for the District Court to dismiss. The District Court also 
erred when it granted, in part, the Respondents' Motion for Attorney Fees and Intervenor's 
Motion to Seal Records. The Appellants therefore respectfully request this Court reverse the 
District Court's rulings below and remand this case for trial in due course. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 2017. 
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